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Summary findings
Like many large countries, Indonesia has difficulty civil service appointment.) But providing specialist attracting doctors to service in rural and remote areas.
training as an incentive to work in remote areas is not To guide the creation of incentives for service in these only expensive, but potentially inefficient, since specialist areas, Chomitz and colleagues analyze two sets of data practice and rural public health management require about physicians: (1) the locations chosen by graduating different skills and attitudes. medical students before and after a major change in the -Moderately (but not extremely) remote areas can be incentive system, and (2) survey data on choices among staffed using modest cash incentives. hypothetical assignments differing in compensation, * Doctors from the Outer Islands are far more willing career prospects, and amenities at various locations.
to serve in remote areas than their counterparts from Their findings suggest that:
Java. So, it may be worthwhile increasing the The current policy of offering specialist training is representation of Outer Island students in medical incentive enough to make doctors from Java willing to schools (perhaps through scholarships and assistance in serve in remote areas. (It is not necessary to also offer a pre-university preparation).
This paper -a product of the Development Research Group -is part of a larger effort in the group to develop methods to analyze public policy in the health sector. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "Incentives for Doctor Placement in Rural and Remote Areas" 
INTRODUCTION
Understanidably, most physicianis prefer to settle In urban areas offering opportunities for professional developimient, educationl and other amenities for their families, and attractive employmilenit opportun-ities. But it is in rural and remote areas, especially in the developing countries, thiat the most severe public healthi problems are found. As a result, there is a mismatch between the geographic distributioll of physicianis and the perceived need for them. (Anderson and Rosenberg 1990; World Banki 1994, p 142) .
The geographic distribution of physicians is of particular concerni for Indoniesia. Indonesia's vast size and difficult geography present a tremendous challenige to hiealth services delivery. It is difficult to place doctors in remote island, mountain, or forest locations with few amenities, no opportunlities for private practice, and poor communicationis with the rest of the country. The problem of placing staff in rural areas is further complicated by the rapid growth of lucrative private sector employment prospects in the largest urban areas. In addition, Indolnesia's development goals strongly emphasize equity across regions, with particular stress on improving healthi status in the most remote and poorly served areas. The country's success in placing health centers in all of its subdistricts only increases the challenige of ensurinig that those centers are staffed.
To improve the geographical distribution of physicians, governments often hiave used combinationis of compulsory service and incenitives. Incenitives for rural service have been used in the US (Connor et al. 1995) , Canada (Bolduc et al forthcomilig; Anderson and Rosernberg 1 990), and Norway (Kristiansen 1992) . The evaluationi, and optimal design, of incentive systems requires an understanding of the responsiveness of physicians to these incentives. Little, hiowever, is systematically kinowil about physiciani preferences. For the developed world, there are a handful of studies which apply econometric methods to choice data, most notably Bolduc et al. (forthcominig) for Quebec, and Hurley (1989, 1990) for the United States; see also Kristiansen (1992) for Norway. .For the developing world there are only anecdotal reports.
This paper analyzes two complementary sets of data about physician preferences in Indonesia.
First, it examines the actual locational choices made by graduating medical students before and after a major change in the incentive system (the revealed preference analysis). Second, it uses survey data on choices among hypothetical assignments to determine physicians' preferences over a set of characteristics describing compensation, career prospects, and locational amenities (the statedpreference analysis.) It builds on, and provides a quaLntitative follow-up, to an earlier, focus-group-based study of contract doctor issues in Indonesia (Soemantri et al 1996) .
PHYSICIAN DISTRIBUTION AND HEALTH POLICY IN INDONESIA
In lndoniesia, most doctors are trained in, and wish to remain in, the cosmopolitan areas of Java.
These areas offer good hospital facilities and lucrative opportuniities for private practice. In order to post doctors to the farflung rural health centers of the Indonesian archipelago, the government has long utilized a system of compulsory service for medical school graduates. In the past, those assigned to more remote regions were compensated with shorter periods of service, which ranged from one year at the most remote postings to five years at desirable locations in Java. Following coompletion of compulsory service, doctors were assured positions in the civil service hierarchy, includinig opportunities for specialist training.
In 1992, this system was modified. Because of a freeze on new civil service hiring, doctors were hired under contract rather than as civil service employees. Service was (and remains) however a prerequisite for obtaining a license to practice. All service is for a period of three years. Pay is tied to remoteness, however. Currently, doctors serving in 'ordinary' regions are paid Rp 500,000/mo; those in remote regions, Rp 825,000, and those in very remote regions, Rp 1 ,050,000/mo. Because doctors in ordinary regions have much greater opportunities for supplementary earnings from private practice, total income differentials are much smaller. A doctor working in a 24-hour clinic in Jakarta could probably earn about Rp 1,000,000/monti (thoughi this would be illegal if the doctor had not yet completed compulsory service.)
Considerinig the difference in amenities associated with remote postings, the salary incentives are relatively modest.
Recognizing this, in 1996, the system was further modified. It vvas announced that the doctors serving in very remote regions would be given a 90% chance of subsequent civil service appointment; those serving in remote regions would have a 50% chance, but the probability drops to 10% for those serving in ordinary areas. Because civil servants are eligible for subsidized specialist training, and because specialists enjoy both high prestige and income, this was expected to serve as a powerful inducement. Section 5 of this paper analyzes the impact of this change in incentive structure.
A number of important policy questions surround the medium and long-term viability of this policy. From the public viewpoint, the policy of offering civil service appointments and specialist traininlg as an incenitive is effective -as we shall see below --but expensive. It costs approximately Rp 60 million to provide specialist training, not includinig the value of the student's time. Since the skills appropriate to running a remote health center differ from those appropriate to a clinical specialist, the incentive policy may result in mismatches of personnel to these two quite different positions. Deferring specialist training for the three years of compulsory service reduces tbe return on that training. Finally, usilng civil service positions as an incentive is problematic given the government's policy of zero net growth in the civil service.
For these reasons, there is interest in alternative means for attracting doctors to remote locations.
One possibility is to assemble alternative incentive packages. Suggested alternatives include higher cash salaries (Soemantri and others 1996) , and reduced periods of compulsory service.
Another possibility is to intensify recruiting of medical students from rural and remote areas, via scholarships, training programs, or placement of new medical schools.
Many doctors are dissatisified with the system. The compulsory nature of the system imposes a particular burden on some graduates, many of them married women, who live in urban Java and are unable for personal reasons to move to other locations. Since there are few openings for compulsory service in these areas, these graduates are indefinitely barred from legally practicing medicine. More generally, graduates of private medical schools question the rationale for compulsory service. So an important question is how much it would cost to attract doctors to health centers if compulsory service were dropped. In many ways the issue parallels the US debate on the all-volunteer army, which also involved considerations of equity, social solidarity, and economic efficiency.
Finally, the labor market for doctors is changing rapidly. While there are current concerns about unemployment of young physicians, the rapid growth of incomes in Indonesia, combined with the expansion of health insurance schemes in the formal sector, suggests that there will be very rapid 4 increases in urban demand for physicians. This in turn raises the question of the cost of maintaining physician services in "ordinary" rural regions --those which are not remote, but which lack urban amenities. Regardless of whether services are financed by public or private sources, it is of interest to forecast the levels of compensating differentials in salaries that might be necessary to retain physicians in these areas.
MODELING PHYSICIAN PREFERENCES
Revealed and stated preference data
Economists' natural tendency is to prefer data on actual choices (revealed preferences) to data on stated preferences. Hurley (1989) , Bolduc and others (forthcoming), and section 4 below use this approach. While this approach has the considerable advantage of an incontravertible grounding in reality, it has several disadvantages. Most importantly, the range of variation of the alternatives may be narrow. This can make it impossible to predict doctors' reactions to new policy initiatives which, for instance, offer new types or magnitudes of incentives. Second, it may be difficult to obtain data on the attributes of the choices, as seen by the doctors. Third, there may be considerable multicollinearity among the location-specific attributes of interest, making it difficult to disentangle their impact on utility. Finally, the need to consider a very large number of alternatives requires complex and possibly nonrobust estimation methods.
The use of stated-preference data can overcome these problems (Louviere 1994). Statedpreference data has increasingly been used in market research to assess consumer reaction to proposed products, and in environmental economics for valuation of nonmarket goods. In one variant, choice-based conjoint analysis, respondents are asked to choose between hypothetical alternatives, where each alternative is described as a bundle of attributes. Because the researcher has complete freedom to specify the levels of the attributes, these can encompass ranges of policy interest, and can be constructed so as to be free of multicollinearity.
Applications of stated-preference discrete-choice models are quite varied. There is a growing literature on dichotomous-choice contingent valuation models (see, e.g. Alberini and others, 1997). These models typically estimate the demand for a hypothetical environmental good or bad.
Typically the choices vary only in the presence or absence of the good, and the level of a compensating payment or charge. More akin to the work presented in this paper are studies which look at preferences over bundles of attributes. For instance, Bunch and others (1993) are interested in the potential demand for electric vehicles, and assess consumers' preferences over alternative combinations of purchase price, fuel cost, and range between refueling, in hypothetical electric and gasoline-powered autos. Adamowicz, Louviere, and Williams (1994) analyze demand for water-based recreational site characteristics such as water quality, type and quantity of fish present, and entry fee.
The chief risk of the stated preference approach is that stated responses may not accurately reflect behavior. For instance, Cummings and others (1995) asked respondents if they would be willing to purchase specified small items (chocolate, a calculator) at certain prices; the researchers then actually offered the items for sale at those prices. They found that stated willingness to purchase was greater thani actual willingness. However, they note that this may be an unfair test; stated preference respondents may be expressing willingness to purchase at some time in the future, while the actual purchase decision was to be made on the spot. In contrast, Louviere (1994) cites a number of studies showing a good correspondence between predictions derived from stated preference models and actual market behavior. Adamowicz, Louviere, and Williams (1994) retrieved very similar preference functions from a group of respondents using both revealed preference and stated preference analyses. This suggests that respondents can competently manage hypothetical questions, and that responses are at least qualitatively reliable. A more serious problem, especially in the current context, is the potential for strategic misrepresentation, if respondents believe that incorrect information can yield personal gain. In this paper, we utilize both types of surveys, checking for consistency.
Utility functions for the nontechnical reader
Note: the technical reader may prefer to skip this section.
In order to analyze physician preferences, we use an economic approach called utility theory.
This approach supposes that doctors choose between alternative assignments as if they have a system for assigning preference scores ('utilities') to each alternative, after which they choose the alternative with the highest score. For instance, suppose that doctors are choosing among alternatives which differ in salary, contract length and remoteness. One doctor might evaluate the positions with a rule like this: add 2 points for every Rp. 1 00,000/month in salary; subtract I I points for every year of contract length; subtract 20 points if the location is remote, and 30 points 6 if it is very remote. Another doctor, with a greater relative desire for cash and tolerance for disamenities, might assign 4 points for every Rp. I OO,OOO/mont:h, but only subtract 5 points for remote location.
The methodology used here employs statistical methods to deduice particular scoring systems for particular types of doctors, so that these scoring systems describe doctors' observed choices as well as possible. In the revealedpreference analysis, we look at how doctors' characteristics affect their choices among four broad locational classes of assignments. In the stated preference analysis, we ask doctors to choose among hypothetical assignments described in more detail, focusing on how the characteristics of the assignments affect the doctors' choices among them.
Utility function specification
Note: nontechnical readers may refer to the previous subsection and skip this one.
Utility-theoretic models of physician choice of location have been estimated by Hurley (1989) for the US, Bolduc and others (forthcoming) for Canada. 
If we assume that the disturbance terms u are independently and identically distributed, and define (2) y*= (XiI-Xi2) 3+ (uijI-ui2) y=1 if choice is assignment 1 then we have a simple probit model.
Note that there is no constant term, because utilities are defined only up to an additive constant.
In addition, the differencing prodedure makes it necessary to exclude one member of each set of mutually exclusive dummy variables to avoid the dummy variable trap.
The assumption of independent, homoscedastic error terms facilitates analysis, and has been standard in the literature. It can be thought of as representing a random error as the respondent tries to come up with a utility estimate. It is however a strong assumption, and its failure would mean that estimates are inconsistent. Further, it does not well represent taste heterogeneity, and can be thought of A direction for future work is to allow for taste heterogeneity by through a random coefficients specification (Berry 1993) . The earlier framework would be modified to become: Now the vector P* describe mean tastes: the mean coefficient for each attribute. Actual tastes vary between individuals. For instance, individuals with a high marginal utility for income would have a high eincome; those with a high marginal disutility for remote areas would have a negative eremoteness. Tlhe genieral form for the variance-covariance inatrix of e reflects the possibility that tastes for particular attributes are intercorrelated across the population; for instance, the marginal utility of income and remoteness may be negatively correlated. This model can be rewritten in the form of (2) as:
where nlow the variance of the error term is a functioni of X I 1 ,Xi 2 , and Q. This can in principle be estimated by an appropriately-adjusted probit. (Chesher 1995 suggests an alternate but similar approach, heterogeneity-adjusted logit.) However, this becomes computational ly chal lenging where, as in the present case, n would have a large number of parameters to be estimated. Note also that if a respondent replies to multiple choice tasks, the errors will be correlated across those tasks, further complicating estimation. These econometric refinements are left for future work.
REVEALED PREFERENCE ANALYSIS 1
Background and data Each year, the Ministry of Health assigns two or three batches of graduating medical students to the compulsory contract positions. To facilitate the process, each candidate is asked to specify first, second, and third choices of posting. Each choice consists of both a province and a remoteness category: ordinary or nonremote (biasa), remote (terpencil) and very remote (sangat terpencil). Not all combinations are possible; there are virtually no 'very remote' postinigs in Java, and no 'ordinary' postings in some outlying provinces. To reduce the large number of alternatives to a more manageable set --and one to which the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption might plausibly apply --we aggregated the available choices into four broad alternatives, based on the combination of province and remoteness: Note: there are few remote postings and almost no very remote postings in Java-Bali.
Primary contributors to this section are Kenneth Chomitz and Gunawan Setiadi.
Alternative 0, Java-Bali, coi1sists overwhelmingly of nonremote lpostings. This was used as the comparison group which multinomial logit requires. That is, sets of coefficients were estimated for each of the other three groups. The equation for one of these groups give the predicted logarithm of the odds of choosing that group relative to the compiarison group.
We obtained the choice data for the 12 th and 13 th assignment batches. The latter was the first under the new policy linking service in remote areas to subsequent civil service appointment.
Basic demographic and background data were also obtained for each candidate, including age, gender, marital status, number of children, religion, and medical faculty. Because graduates who do not accept an assignment are held over and permitted to bid in subsequent batches, we restricted our attention to those who had registered after the cutolf for the previous batch in order to focus on the choices of new entrants to the process.
Appendix table 1 shows definitions and mean values of independent variables for the two batches.
Results and discussion
Simple cross tabulations (see Table 1 ) show the powerful impact of the change in incentives. In batch 12, among students graduating from medical faculties in Java/Bali, only 5.6% of males and 1.7% of females volunteered to go to very remote areas in the Outer Islands. In batch 13, those proportions increased to 20.7% and 6.7%. The cross tabulations also show that, regardless of the incentive regime, students from outer island faculties are far more likely to volunteer for remote and very remote outer island assignments than are students from Java/Bali faculties.
Multivariate analysis allows us to determine whether these observed relations are due to omitted factors such as age or private schooling. This is potentially important since the mix of doctors (e.g., proportion from private school) varies substantially between batches. The multinomial logit results are shown in appendix 
Main results
The results are most easily understood by examining the predicted effect of a change in a particular variable on the choice probabilities. Figure I shows the predicted choice probabilities of four classes of students: male/female x Java-Bali medical school /Outer Island medical school, for the two batches 2 . These predictions closely mirror the cross-tabulation results presented above. There are several important results:
1) Incentives had a large impact on the willingness of Java/Bali graduates to volunteer for remote and very remote posts.
Compare the columns marked "Java male 12", "Java male 13". Controlling for other characteristics, the proportion willing to go to ordinary or remote posts in the outer islands increases almost threefold, from about 17% to fbouf 50%. The proportion willing to go to very remote posts increases more than fivefold, from 3. 1% to 17.8%.
It is particularly striking that incentives also have a strong impact on females, since women are sometimes said to have less flexibility. It is true that women from Java/Bali schools are on average less willing to volunteer for remoter posts (compare the columns "Java male 12" and "Java female 12"). Nevertheless, there was a substantial reponse to the introduction of improved incentives: the proportion willing to go to Outer Island nonremote posts increased from 5.8% to 28.1%; the proportion willing to go to very remote posts increased from 3.5% to 9.5%.
2) Graduates of outer island medical schools are substantially more likely to volunteer for service in remote areas than graduates of Java/Bali schools.
This effect is large, statistically significant at the .001 level, ancl especially true in the absence of incentives. In batch 12, for instance, the predicted probability of volunteering for a remote or very remote post is 75% for an outer island male graduate, against 17% for a Java/Bali male graduate. Among women in batch 12, 46% of outer island graduates were predicted to choose outer island remote posts, as opposed to just 5% of Java/Bali graduates. The introduction of improved incentives reduces, but does not eliminate, the differential between outer island and Java/Bali graduates.
Differentials by public vs. private schooling
In the estimates for batch 13 males, a dummy for private school attendance enters positively and significantly in the equations for nonremote and remote outer island assignments. For batch 12 males, the dummy is positive and significant in the nonremote outer island equation, negative and significant in the very remote outer island equation. The variable is nowhere significant in the estimates for females. The predicted impacts for males, batch 13, are shown in figure 2. Other things equal, males from JavalBali private schools are slightly rnore willing to volunteer for outer island posts, but less willing to volunteer for very remote postings (18% vs. 25%).
Marital status and children
13
The effects of marital status and children are weaker thaii might be expected. It is clear from the coefficient estimates that married women with children do not volunteer for posts in very remote areas. Otherwise, however, there are no statistically significant effects of current marital status on women's willingness to volunteer for remote postings. However, it may well be the case that it is expectations about marriage and children which matter, not current status. At this stage in their life cycle, many doctors may anticipate marrying at about the same time that they undertake their compulsory service.
Other things equal, currently married men are less willing to volunteer for nonremote outer island and remote outer island posts. For males from Java/Bali schools, being married reduces willingess to go to any outer island post from 68% to 48%.
Effect of age and time since graduation
In the batch 12 results, age and graduation year had small, statistically insignificant impacts. In batch 13, however, the impacts are profound. suggest that recent (1996) graduates are far more responsive to incentives than earlier graduates (1990). This is highly plausible, since the latter are more likely to have developed family and employment ties which reduce their flexibility. Age independently reduces the willingness to volunteer for outer island remote postings.
Summary
Tying service in remote areas to subsequent civil service appointment was, according to this analysis, sufficient to drastically boost the willingess of graduates of Java/Bali schools to serve in outer island and remote areas. However, the post-incentive willingess of these graduates to serve in remote areas was lower than the pre-incentive willingness of graduates from schools in the outer islands. 
Figure 1 Compare base & private school graduates on predicted probability of choosing outer island assignment, by remoteness (batch 13) 
STATED PREFERENCE ANALYSIS
Background and motivation
The stated-preference analysis was designed to answer questions which could not be answered with the revealed preference analysis, in particular: The large sample of the stated-preference survey also allows a more detailed look at the influence of doctor characteristics on doctor preferences.
Sample
The stated-preference survey was targeted on final-year medical students, who would be shortly facing the task of choosinig locations for their compulsory medical service. The survey covered 14 of lndoniesia's 32 medical schiools, a group comprising 70% of all graduates 3 . It encompassed public and private schiools, and included three off-Java schools . The survey was administered to 585 final-year students. An effort was made to recruit as many respondents as possible; randomness of selection was therefore sacrificed in order to maximize sample size. Surveys were administered examination-style to groups of students; discussion was prohibited during survey administration. Surveys were conducted over the period May-June 1997.
Instrument
The survey instrument consisted of two parts: a set of choice tasks, and a series of background questions on respondent characteristics (see appendix B). Each respondent faced a set of eighteen choice tasks. Each task consisted of a choice between two hypothetical job assignments.
Based on the latest available data, for 1994. Seven newly-founded schools had no graduates during that year. Box 1
Some combinations of attributes were prohibited as impossible, for instance remote or very remote health centers in Jakarta. (See Annex B4.) The combinations of attributes were randomly generated using the Choice-Based-Conjoint program (Sawtooth Software, n.d.). Fifty different sets of eighteen tasks were generated. An example of a choice task is shown in Box 1.
Instructions to the respondents are reproduced in appendix B3.
Results
Four models were run, for each combination of gender and outer island vs. Java/Bali birthplace.
The basic independent variables were differences between choice I and choice 2 in the seven attributes listed above. In addition, private school was interacted with the income, civil service, and specialist training difference variables; the characteristic, "grew up in rural areas or a small town" was interacted with the difference in the very remote and remote dummies; a dummy for "ever failed a course" was interacted with probability of specialist training; and difference The coefficients are almost all plausible and statistically significant. A useful way interpreting them is to express the utility or disutility of each attribute in terms of monetary equivalents. For instance, if the estimated utility function is:
U= 10*(salary in thousand rupiahs/mo) -2000 (contract length in years) + 50000(probability of specialist training) then:
* a one year decrease in the contract length is equivalent to a Rp 200 (==2000/1 0) thousand increase in monthly salary; i.e. the cash equivalent of an additional year of contract length is Rp-200,000 (the minus sign indicates that contract length is a disamenity, something that is disliked)
* certainty of receiving specialist training is equivalent to a Rp 5000 (=50000/10) thousand increase in monthly salary; i.e., the cash equivalent of specialty training is Rp 5 million/month. 6 These significance statements are made on the basis of the coefficient of the variable in question; they should properly be based on the ratio of that coefficient to the coefficient of salary.
21
The results are organized in the table of compensating differentials. Consider the first column, referring to male public school graduates from Java/Bali. On average within this group, and holding location, career prospects and all else equal, graduates would be willing to forgo Rp 187,000 /month in income in order to reduce contract length by one year. (It is important to remember that this represents median preferences --some would accept a smaller reduction, others would demand a larger one). Private school graduates (second column) have a much higher disutility for contract length. For them, a year of reduced service is worth almost Rp 1.3 million/month.
A large value is attached to civil service appointment by public school graduates, even in the absence of specialist training. An increase in the probability of appointment from 0% to 100% is valued on average at Rp 2,189,000/month by male public school graduates from Java/Bali.
Continuing down the first column, males from Java/Bali place an extremely high value on specialist training. On average, a 25 year old graduate values this at Rp 4,247,000/month. This is quite reasonable given the increase in earnings associated with specialist education. Value declines with age, reflecting the shorter working lifetime of the training, and perhaps the perceived chance of being deemed to old to enter specialist training.
As expected, a huge disutility is attached to very remote (sangat terpencil) location --this requires a compensating differential of nearly a million rupiah/month, compared to service in a nonremote private clinic. Surprisingly, however, there is no significant disutility attached to service in remote or nonremote health centers relative to nonremote private clinics, controlling for province. This is the most unexpected finding of the analysis.
The relative magnitudes of the disutilities attached to the provinces are in accord with popular perceptions of the desirability of these postings for a cosmopolitan Javanese. Central Java is rated as 'worth' Rp 246,000/month less than Jakarta (the comparison location) to a public school graduate, though this difference is not statistically significant. Northern Sumatra, which boasts a large metropolis with good career prospects, has a relatively low disutility attached to it. The remote provinces of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) and Central Kalimantan (KalTeng) require compensating differentials of about Rp 1 million/month. Irian Jaya, the province with the most challenging conditions, requires a differential of nearly Rp 2 million /month, in addition to the 22 differentials for very remote locations. A post in the province of schooling is considered worth Rp. 442,000/month. (A separate variable for posting in home province was not significant.)
The second column repeats these calculations for male private school graduates from Java/Bali.
There are some striking differences. Essentially no value is attached to a civil service appointment by itself (as opposed to specialist training). The cornpensating differential attached to length of service is very high: Rp -1,279,000/month, versus Rp -187,000 for the public school counterparts. The differentials attached to service in more remote provinces are about twice as high as those for the public school graduates. Posting in the province of schooling (likely to also be the student's home province) is valued at almost Rp I million/month.
The third column describes the preferences of female public school graduates from Java/Bali.
Compared to their male counterparts, they have a higher disutility for contract length, with an additional year equivalent to a loss of Rp 429,000/month. As with the males, they place a very high value both on civil service appointment and on specialist training. The locational values show interesting, and expected, contrasts with the males. Unlike the males, the females place a very high disutility on remote (terpencil) locations: these carry a disutility equivalent to a loss of Rp 1,303,000/month. Very remote locations carry an immense penalty of over Rp 3 million/month, three times the disutility expressed by males. The province-specific values are similar to those of the males, with two differences. First, the females actually have a strong preference for Central Java relative to Jakarta. Second, they have on average a much stronger distaste for service in Irian Jaya. Service at a very remote location in Irian Jaya would require a compensating differential of more than Rp 6 million/month in cash, in order to be equivalent to a nonremote post in Jakarta.
Turning now to outer island male public school graduates (column 5), there are some interesting contrasts with their Java-born counterparts. The outer island males do not attach any significant disutility to contract length. They prefer nonremote health centers to nonremote private clinics.
The disutility they attach to very remote locations (Rp -615,000/rnonth) is one-third less than their Javan counterparts. The province-specific disutilities are quite low compared to the Javans:
there is essentially no disutility attached to service in Central Kalimantan, and only Rp -500,000/month for service in Irian Jaya. Finally, outer island females are intermediate between Javan males and Javan females in terms of their disutility for remote and very remote posts.
Outer island females place an extremely higih premium oni service in their province of schooling (Rp 1.8 million/month), but they also place a higih premium on service in their birth province (Rp 1,082,000/monthi, not shown in table).
Discussion
There are several potential sources of bias in these results. First, the respondents may not have understood, or complied with, the instructionis regarding the choice scenario. For instance, they may believe that choice of a remote location would in fact increase their chance of receiving specialist training, regardless of the probability assigned in the choice task. Second, the respondents may have strategic reasons for misstating their preferences. They may believe, for instance, that they can influence public policy in their favor by overstating the salary or training benefits necessary to induce service in remote areas. Or they may believe that 'socially acceptable' responses indicating willingness to serve in remote areas will in some way yield individual or group benefits.
One way to check the results is to compare them to the revealed preference analysis. There is strong qualitative consistency between the two analyses. Both shiow similar differentials in preferences between males and females, between outer island and Java/Bali graduates, and among age or graduation groups. Both show very strong responsiveness to civil-service related incentives. In particular, the increase between batches 12 and 13 in preferences for outer island nonremote and remote locations --despite the relatively small probabilities of civil service appointment (10% and 50%) --is consistent with the relatively low disutilities estimated for these positions (except in the least preferred provinces). If there is bias in the results, it is difficult to know in which direction it goes. Consequently, a conservative approach to interpreting the compensating differentials is to accept relative magnitudes, but be cautious about absolute magnitudes.
A drawback of the compensating differentials estimates is that, by definition, they describe the value at which respondents with specified characteristics would divide themselves evenly between the two alternatives given. Since doctors may vary in their tastes, it would be of interest to determine how the proportion of doctors choosing, say, service in Irian Jaya as salary increases. This is a complex computational task; our results allow us easily to estimate the proportion who would choose Irian Jaya over Jakarta if there were only those two choices. Of, course, in practice the doctor must choose among a large number of alternatives; our task is to calculate the probability of choosinig each alternative from the complete set, given the predicted preferences between each pair of alternatives. To do this properl y requires a more detailed treatment of heterogeneity of tastes, and will be a topic for follow-on work.
Policy implications
Problems with the current situation.
There are two problems. First, compulsory service is inequitable for medical students, mostly females, who are unable to accept remote or distant postings. The burden imposed by these postings is evident in the huge disutilities attached to these postings--compulsory service in a very remote area is viewed as equivalent to a 'tax' of Rp 4 million or more a month. These graduates are faced with an unattractive set of alternatives: indefinite unemployment, illegal work as a doctor, or abandonment of their training in favor of a nonmedical career. Alternatively, if public authorities waive the rules and allow these graduates to satisfy their compulsory service in Jakarta or West Java, other graduates may perceive this as inequitable.
Second, providing specialist training as an incentive is not only expensive, but inefficient.
Doctors who are particularly interested in specialist training may not be much interested in, or suited for, public health work in remote areas. Furthermore, delaying entry into specialist training by three years (of compulsory service) means that doctors do not complete that training until their late thirties or early forties. This significantly reduces the private and social returns to that training.
Possible modifications of the current policy
a) The estimates suggest that incentive payments for very remote (sangat terpencil) service of the order of Rp I to 1.5 million/month would be attractive to the imedian outer island male graduate. Based on a three year contract, this is less expensive, from the government's point of view, than the cost of paying for specialist training for 90% of these doctors 7 . The current total W we are assuming that government or social costs of specialist training at public universities are comparable to those at private universities, estimated at about Rp 60 million. b) However, if the supply of outer island graduates is insufficient to fill the vacancies, then it would be necessary to continue to offer specialist training in order to induce many Javans to work in very remote areas. Cash incentives for graduates from Java would be more expensive thall this training incentive. The results suggest that it is not necessary to offer a civil service appointment in addition to the specialist training, however. c) Remote (te,pencil, as opposed to very remote) posts in the outer islands can be filled by male public school graduates from Java with a salary bonus of about Rp I million/month (above Jakarta private wages --making a total of about Rp 2 million/month), and from outside Java for a much smaller bonus, of perhaps Rp 300,000 for most provinces. The latter is much smaller, and the former is comparable to, the cost of the current policy of providing specialist training to 50% of the doctors in these posts.
d) The above policy could be integrated with one offering indefinite contract renewals to PTT doctors now serving in remote and very remote areas. A companion survey will provide data on1 the potential cost and impact of this policy. e) Perhaps most importantly, both the revealed preference and stated preference results emphasize the much greater willingness of people from the outer islands to serve in remote and very remote locations. This suggests very substantial gains to increasing the representation of outer island students in medical schools. This might be accomplished by scholarships and assistance in pre-university preparation.
f) It has frequently been suggested that public healtlh graduates might be trained as healtlh center managers, as an alternative to using physicians as managers. The results presented here would encourage the establishment of such training programs in the outer islands, or for students from the outer islands. These students, lacking the urban employment prospects of doctors, would be expected to be even more willing to volunteer for remote and very remote service than outer island medical students. g) Concurrently with the above policy changes, compulsory service for doctors might be abandoned, at least for students at private schools and for students at public schlools willing to pay unsubsidized tuition fees. Grouping variable: id 
